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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3242-79/1


19 June 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 19 June with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.


William Parmenter

Attachment
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7 - NFAC/RI

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NFAC #3242-79

19 June 1979

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 8

USSR, CUBA AND EAST GERMANY

Analysts see a basically political emphasis in Soviet and Cuban strategy and tactics toward southern Africa during the summer, and they again emphasize that Moscow and Havana wish to avoid getting out in front of the Frontline African leaders. This means, in their view, continuing to push unity of the Zimbabwe guerrilla movements. The different feature is the widening of contacts with ZANU, and an opening of the door by the Soviets to supplies of arms for ZANU as well as keeping a flow going to ZAPU. CIA analysts, however, are puzzled by some aspects of Soviet relations with ZAPU -- e.g., why has the head of the Soviet training mission apparently not returned from Moscow? Analysts also point to the gradual expansion of East German activity, although this does not appear to be aimed specifically at Africa but to be part of a general emergence of the East Germans into the Third World. []

SOUTH AFRICA, NAMIBIA, RHODESIA, ZAMBIA

Analysts see no great urgency behind South African policy toward Namibia or Rhodesia at this point, nor any apparent requirement for large or dramatic military operations in either arena for the next couple of months. They warn, however, that the South Africans may think they see things that we do not, especially in Namibia, where they are trying to build credibility for an internal settlement. The maize shortage has not been alleviated; Zambia has announced it has only five weeks supply remaining, with the Commonwealth Conference and the Queen's visit upcoming. []

TANZANIA, UGANDA, KENYA

Analysts see the situation in Uganda as deteriorating, as the Ugandans revert to tribal and regional politicking. We note that [] has suggested that the Ugandans call on Cuba for assistance with their presidential security service; if the Ugandans follow this suggestion, it would alarm the Kenyans []

**This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

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SUDAN

The impact of refugees from Uganda on southern Sudan could be serious in view of their capability to raid back across the border and the scarcity of food supplies in this area. In northern Sudan, there seems to be growing criticism of the Nimeiry regime among the populace, although the army is still loyal as far as we know, and there is a continuing possibility of popular demonstrations and strikes against the government. [REDACTED]

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HORN OF AFRICA

Analysts note the progress the Soviets are making in developing naval support facilities on Dahlak Island in the Red Sea. No bunkering is available there, and the major elements of the facilities can be moved on short notice, but Dahlak does now provide a ship repair capability which the Soviets in the Indian Ocean have lacked since they were ejected from Berbera in 1977. In the Ogaden, the Somali response to increased Ethiopian pressure on the WSLF over the past several weeks has been to second additional regular Somali military officers to direct guerrilla operations. This is not, of course, a new pattern, and we do not expect any new developments to flow out of it. [REDACTED]

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WEST AFRICA

The dangers of secession in southern Chad have not receded and are not likely to do so. Analysts are concerned that the situation in Ghana bears close watching; there is danger of some kind of turn to the left emerging from the post-coup chaos. Indeed, the situation in the urban agglomerations in West Africa, running from Senegal to Zaire, is basically so bad that there is a potential for rioting on the Monrovia or Accra models in virtually any country of the region. The ineffective performance of the Liberian government in the face of the troubles there has led to muttering that the Tolbert regime should go. If this should happen, our facilities might be endangered. [REDACTED]

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NIGERIA

There are signs that the Nigerian government is becoming progressively more serious in its desire to enforce economic boycotts and to influence US policy toward Africa. How far the Nigerians intend to take this we do not know, but it clearly will embarrass US companies and US-Nigerian relations in the months before the advent of civilian rule in October. [REDACTED]

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MAURITANIA

The installation of yet another government does not alter the basic worries of the analysts that the country may slowly be coming apart, with the northern portion associating with a Saharan state and the southern with Senegal. [REDACTED]

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ZAIRE

The withdrawal of the Inter-African Force is now close enough that reports are beginning to come in on what purport to be ex-Katangans' plans to move against Shaba. We have no way of judging how serious these are, but note that the basic situation is not healthy, to say the least. [REDACTED]

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OAU MEETING

The OAU representatives, foreign ministers, and chiefs of state will assemble in stages in Monrovia next month for their annual potlatch. In addition to the usual rhetoric, there is evidently a good deal of local tension surrounding the meeting because Liberia's preparatory expenditures were one object of the anger of the rioters in April. [REDACTED]

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